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Abstract: 
In three experiments, we examined the role of the detection and recollection of change in 
proactive effects of memory in a classic A–B, A–D paradigm. Participants studied two lists of 
word pairs that included pairs repeated across lists (A–B, A–B), pairs with the same cue but a 
changed response (A–B, A–D) in the second list, and control pairs (A–B, C–D). The results 
revealed that performance on A–B, A–D pairs reflected a mixture of facilitation and interference 
effects. Proactive facilitation occurred when changes in responses were detected and recollected, 
whereas proactive interference occurred when change was not detected or when it was not 
recollected. We describe detecting change as involving recursive remindings that result in 
memory for the List 1 response being embedded in the representation of memory for the List 2 
response. These embedded representations preserve the temporal order of the responses. Our 
findings highlight the importance of detection and recollection of change for proactive effects of 
memory. 
Keywords: Change detection | Proactive effects | Interference | Facilitation | Recursive 
remindings 
Articles: 
A politician changes his position on an important issue in a way that contradicts an earlier-held 
position and hopes that the change will go unnoticed. If noticed, he fears that having made the 
change in position will result in his being labeled as a “flip-flopper.” However, even if the 
change is unnoticed, there is reason to expect an influence of memory for the earlier-held 
position on that for the later-held position because of proactive interference. In the language of 
paired-associate learning, the situation can be represented as A (politician)–B (earlier position) 
followed by A (politician)–D (changed position). Proactive interference refers to the deleterious 
effects of memory for A–B on later recall of A–D. Such interference has been found in 
laboratory experiments examining memory for paired associates and has been attributed to 
response competition (e.g., Postman & Underwood, 1973). If the A–B association is a strong 
one, memory for the original response (B) is said to compete with the changed response (D) and 
to produce proactive interference by serving as a source of errors during attempts to recall the 
changed response. 
When is an audience likely to become aware of change in a politician’s position, and what are 
the effects of awareness of this change on subsequent memory? For change to be noted and 
remembered, it is necessary that a later event remind one of the corresponding earlier event(s). 
Again in the language of memory for paired associates, it is important that one be reminded of 
A–B by the presentation of A–D. For the self-contradicting politician, the change in position 
with regard to an issue is more likely to be detected if the initial position was repeatedly stated, 
making it more easily remembered. Being reminded of the earlier position (A–B) by presentation 
of the changed position (A–D) might further enhance memory for the earlier position. More 
importantly for the present purposes, such change detection might also be followed by 
recollection of the change and, thereby, enhance memory for the later-held position (i.e., 
proactive facilitation). 
Continuing the example of contradictory positions held by a politician, the underlying memory 
representation could take the form of “Politician A, who earlier held position B, now holds 
position D.” The form is one of recursion, which serves to embed the earlier event into the 
memory representation for the later event. Corballis (2011) argued that memory is recursive and 
that its being so serves as the origin of language and thought. A recursive representation creates 
dependence between the original and changed responses, making it likely that they will later be 
recalled together. Also, as was noted by Hintzman (2011), recursive reminding preserves the 
temporal order of events. Because of these effects, we argue that recursive reminding can result 
in proactive facilitation of memory for the changed response (A–D). Although recursive 
remindings are sometimes spontaneous (Hintzman, 2011), we hold that individual differences 
and task demands also play a role in the occurrence of recursive remindings (e.g., Jacoby, 1974). 
In the experiments reported here, we examined the effects of detection and memory for change 
with paired associates. To anticipate the results, we show that detection and memory for change 
produced proactive facilitation. Proactive facilitation is shown by memory for a second event 
(A–D) being superior to the memory that would be observed if the first event (A–B) had not 
occurred (i.e., a control condition). Increasing the number of presentations of A–B had the effect 
of increasing detection of change and, thereby, produced increased memory for A–D. In the 
absence of detection and memory for change, prior presentation of A–B reduced later memory of 
A–D (i.e., proactive interference). Before describing our experiments, we will briefly review the 
relevant literature. 
Prior research has shown the importance of remindings for memory of the temporal order of 
events and for effects of repetitions. Judgments of recency are superior for related (e.g., queen–
king) as compared to unrelated (e.g., spider–table) words (Hintzman, 2010; Tzeng & 
Cotton, 1980; Winograd & Soloway, 1985). This effect on memory for temporal order has been 
explained as being due to the presentation of the second member of a related pair (e.g., king) 
reminding participants of the first member of the pair (e.g., queen). Remindings also play a role 
in frequency judgments (Hintzman, 2004) and in memory for semantic associates (e.g., Benjamin 
& Ross, 2010). For each of these cases, remindings are said to have their effect by embedding 
memory for the earlier event into that of the later event. Brain regions such as the left posterior 
hippocampus and parahippocampal cortex have been shown to be associated with individual 
differences in response integration and susceptibility to retroactive interference, suggesting 
potential biological correlates of remindings (e.g., Kuhl, Shah, DuBrow, & Wagner, 2010). 
Of particular relevance to the present experiments, remindings are important for finding 
facilitative effects of repetitions. An early example of this can be seen in the paired-associate 
learning experiments by Asch, Rescorla, and Linder, as reported by Asch (1969). In their 
experiments, a single well-learned pair from a first list was included in a second list of pairs that 
was presented after a delay. This form of presentation discouraged participants from recognizing 
the repetition in List 2, resulting in a small percentage of participants doing so. Participants who 
did not recognize the repeated pair as being such showed no advantage in memory for the 
repeated pairs, as compared to new pairs that only appeared in List 2. In contrast, participants 
who did recognize the repetition showed a facilitative effect. Furthermore, when another group 
was told about the repetition and encouraged to notice it prior to studying List 2, nearly every 
participant did so and showed a facilitative effect of repetition. Encouraging participants to 
notice the repetition can be described as encouraging them to engage in reminding. Similarly, 
Appleton-Knapp, Bjork, and Wickens (2005) showed the importance of reminding for the effect 
of spacing repetitions on memory for advertisements. Their results showed that study-phase 
retrievals (i.e., remindings) contributed to the benefit of spacing repetitions. At long spacings of 
repetitions, inducing variations in ads by changes in formatting or content reduced the effects of 
repetition by decreasing remindings of earlier variants of an ad (for further evidence of the 
importance of remindings for the effects of spacing repetitions, see Benjamin & Tullis, 2010; 
Johnston & Uhl, 1976). 
The above experiments provided evidence that judgments of temporal order and repetition 
effects are facilitated by remindings that result in detection and memory of consistency among 
events. Similarly, detection and memory for change might rely on reminding and produce 
facilitation effects. Experiments examining memory for paired associates in A–B, A–D 
paradigms have typically found proactive interference. However, several studies have shown that 
performance on A–B, A–D pairs does not differ from, or is even better than, performance on 
controls (e.g., Barnes & Underwood, 1959; Bruce & Weaver, 1973; E. Martin, 1968; 
Postman, 1964; Robbins & Bray, 1974). We argue that these differences can be explained by 
variation in the probability of remindings and describe advantages of our recursive-remindings 
account over a mediation account of facilitation effects (e.g., Barnes & Underwood, 1959). 
Barnes and Underwood (1959) found retroactive facilitation effects by varying the similarity of 
responses in two lists. For an A–B, A–B' paradigm, the responses in List 2 were synonyms of the 
responses in List 1 (e.g., afraid, scared), whereas in an A–B, A–D paradigm the responses were 
unrelated. At test, participants recalled responses from both lists. For the A–B, A–D paradigm, 
recall of List 1 declined with increased numbers of trials on List 2, showing retroactive 
interference. In contrast, for the A–B, A–B' paradigm, recall of List 2 was nearly perfect after 
one trial, and recall of List 1 did not decline appreciably across increases in List 2 trials. 
Facilitation in the A–B, A–B' paradigm was explained as resulting from participants taking 
advantage of the strong associations between responses by using List 1 responses to mediate 
their learning of the List 2 responses. That is, List 2 learning was said to be of the form A–B–B'. 
Support for this mediation account was provided by the finding that the List 1 response was more 
often recalled first, as would be expected if learning of the List 2 response was mediated by the 
List 1 response. Furthermore, nearly all participants reported using the List 1 response to help 
them remember the List 2 response. 
It is important that participants were aware of using List 1 responses to aid their memory of List 
2 responses in the Barnes and Underwood (1959) experiment. R. B. Martin and Dean (1964) 
provided direct evidence of the importance of such awareness for finding effects that have been 
attributed to mediation by associations. In their experiment, participants learned a list of A–B 
pairs and then learned a second list that contained pairs for which the response was a strong 
associate of a List 1 response (i.e., Barnes & Underwood’s A–B, A–B' condition), as well as 
pairs for which the responses in the two lists were unrelated (i.e., Barnes & Underwood’s A–B, 
A–D condition). Following the test of the second list, participants described how they had 
learned each pair. Results revealed an advantage for the A–B, A–B' pairs over A–B, A–D pairs 
only for A–B, A–B' pairs whose learning was reported as relying on memory of the List 1 
response. R. B. Martin and Dean distinguished between explicit (aware) and implicit (unaware) 
mediation and concluded that their results showed no evidence of implicit mediation. The 
importance of awareness has led some (see Hall, 1971, pp. 396–398) to doubt the existence of 
associative mediation of the sort credited for effects of strong associations between responses 
(e.g., Russell & Storms, 1955). 
As an alternative to a mediation account, facilitation of memory for a changed response can be 
described as resulting from detection and later recollection of change. Doing so explains the 
importance of awareness of the relationship between the original and changed responses. By a 
memory-for-change account, detection of change results from study-phase remindings that are 
available to conscious awareness. Awareness of change is important for facilitating performance 
because what is thought about an item during its presentation is what is encoded in memory. 
When change is detected, the earlier pair (A–B) is embedded into a representation of the later 
pair (A–D), preserving the order of the two responses (cf. Hintzman, 2010). Recollection of the 
recursive reminding at test results in proactive facilitation. In contrast to mediation accounts of 
proactive facilitation (e.g., Barnes & Underwood, 1959), the memory-for-change account 
predicts that proactive facilitation will not require the presence of a strong associative 
relationship between responses. Although it is likely necessary for there to be some potential 
relationship between responses in order to produce detection of change along with recursive 
encoding, we predict that proactive facilitation can be found even when there is only a very weak 
or no preexperimental association between responses. 
Whereas memory for change provides a means of preserving the order of events, a mediation 
account of proactive facilitation does not do so. A strong extraexperimental association between 
B and D does not by itself preserve information regarding the lists in which the responses 
occurred. Indeed, one might expect that a strong association between responses would reduce list 
differentiation and, thereby, result in List 1 responses more often intruding when participants are 
asked to recall List 2 responses. Results of this sort were reported by Young (1955). In Young’s 
experiments, the similarity of adjectives paired with a cue varied from low to medium to high. In 
a test of the proactive effects of earlier presentations, the number of intrusions of adjectives from 
earlier lists increased with the similarity of adjectives. 
We forward a dual-process model that holds that proactive facilitation originates from recursive 
remindings that embed memory for a List 1 pairing (A–B) in memory for a List 2 pairing (A–D), 
just as described for the self-contradicting politician, rather than from mediation between 
responses. In doing so, we build on evidence showing the importance of awareness of repetition 
(remindings) for the magnitude of repetition effects (e.g., Appleton-Knapp et al., 2005; 
Asch, 1969), but focus on the detection of change rather than on the detection of consistency 
(e.g., repetition). In the absence of detection and recollection of change, participants are held to 
rely on associative strength as a basis for responding (e.g., Postman & Underwood, 1973), with 
the result that proactive interference is observed, whereas recollection of change results in 
proactive facilitation. 
It is likely that a dual-process model is necessary to account for the effects of repetition and 
change. In that vein, Hintzman (2004) convincingly showed that judgments of frequency depend 
on recursive remindings. However, very dense amnesics also show an effect of repetition on 
frequency judgments, although they are unable to engage in recollection of the sort necessary to 
profit from remindings. For amnesics, increasing the frequency of presentation of an item 
increases both its judged frequency and recency, as does increasing the recency of presentation 
of an item. These results suggest that amnesics make both recency and frequency judgments on 
the basis of overall memory strength (Huppert & Piercy, 1978) and support the possibility that 
repetition can result in a strengthening of memory that has relatively automatic effects, as well as 
in recursive remindings that rely on recollection. 
It is difficult to separate the effects of recollection from those of automatic influences on 
frequency and recency judgments, because both serve to enhance performance. In contrast, 
arranging a situation such that the automatic influences of memory produce an effect that is 
opposite to that produced by recollection has important advantages as a means of gaining 
evidence to support a dual-process model of memory (e.g., Jacoby, 1991; for a review, see 
Yonelinas & Jacoby, 2012). In this vein, strong support for a dual-process model would be 
provided by findings that a change produces proactive facilitation when the change is detected 
and recollected but produces an opposite effect (i.e., proactive interference) in the absence of 
detection and recollection. 
According to our dual-process model, the overall later recall of changed responses in an A–B, 
A–D paradigm reflects a mixture of proactive facilitation originating from recollection of 
change, encoded as a recursive reminding, and proactive interference originating from a more 
automatic basis for responding that reflects associative strength. To gain support for this claim, 
what is needed are means of measuring the detection and recollection of change. Next, we 
describe the procedure of Experiment 1 in order to introduce the measures of detection and 
recollection of change employed in our experiments. 
In our experiments, we employed a within-participants manipulation of the correspondence 
between List 1 and List 2 pairs. List 2 included pairs that were the same as those in List 1 (A–B, 
A–B), pairs for which the response was changed between lists (A–B, A–D), and pairs for which 
neither member of the pair had appeared in List 1 (A–B, C–D). In contrast to the pairs used in 
investigations of mediation effects (e.g., Barnes & Underwood, 1959), the right-hand members 
of A–B and A–D pairs were, at most, weak preexperimental associates of one another. A–B pairs 
were presented either two or four times in List 1. Manipulating the relation between the pairs in 
the two lists allowed us to investigate change detection and memory for change. To measure 
detection of change during List 2, participants were instructed to indicate whether they noticed 
that a response paired with a cue presented in List 1 had changed between lists (i.e., A–B, A–D 
pairs). Furthermore, they were told to recall the List 1 response when they detected such a 
change. 
At test, participants were provided with the left-hand member of each pair presented in List 2 
and asked to recall the right-hand member of that pair. To measure recollection of change at the 
time of test, we employed a remindings-report procedure. Participants were instructed that if 
another word came to mind prior to or simultaneously with a word that they produced as being a 
List 2 response, they were to report the word that came to mind. Reporting a List 1 response as 
having come to mind was treated as indicating that a reminding had occurred during List 2 study 
and was recollected at test. The rationale for doing so was that if change was recollected, the List 
1 response would be expected to come to mind prior to or simultaneously with the List 2 
response because of the dependency created by the underlying recursive representation. 
Returning to the example of a self-contradicting politician, the suggestion is that if asked to 
recall the politician’s current position, the prior position would likely come to mind first or 
simultaneously with the current position—that is, the “flip” will come to mind prior to the 
“flop.” 
We expected that the accessibility of List 1 responses would increase with List 1 presentations, 
thus producing a higher probability of change detection for A–B, A–D items during the 
presentation of List 2, along with a higher probability of recollection of change as measured by 
the remindings-report procedure. Proactive facilitation was expected when change was 
recollected, and proactive interference resulting from automatic influences of memory was 
expected when change was not recollected. 
To gain evidence of the importance of recollection of change, we conditionalized the probability 
of List 2 recall in the A–B, A–D condition on the presence versus absence of change recollection 
as measured by the remindings-report procedure. Reliance on conditionalized results carries the 
danger that the results obtained would be influenced by item selection effects. In this vein, a 
modestly positive correlation has been found in the rates of acquisition of first- and second-list 
responses to the same stimulus in the A–B, A–D paradigm (Postman & Stark, 1969; Wichawut 
& Martin, 1971). This correlation presumably reflects differences among stimuli in the ease of 
their recognition and/or the ease with which associations to other items can be formed. For our 
results, effects obtained by conditionalizing recall on memory for change might reflect such item 
differences. Consequently, we employed hierarchical regression analyses to show that for each of 
our experiments, memory for change had effects beyond those produced by item differences. 
We also employed hierarchical regression analyses to examine whether individual differences in 
the probability of recollection of change were correlated with List 2 recall. As we will describe 
in the General Discussion, people likely differ in the extent to which they detect and remember 
change. Individual differences in detection and memory for change have not previously been a 
focus for investigation but are likely to be important for performance on a variety of tasks. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
A group of 40 Washington University students participated in exchange for course credit or 
$10/h. All participants were tested individually. 
Design and materials 
A 3 (item type: A–B, A–B vs. A–B, C–D [control] vs. A–B, A–D) × 2 (List 1 presentations: four 
vs. two) within-participants design was used. The design was fully crossed with the exception of 
control pairs, because they were not subjected to the manipulation of List 1 repetitions. The 
critical materials consisted of 100 three-word sets that included a cue word (e.g., knee) and two 
responses associated with the cue (e.g., bone, bend). These sets were drawn from Jacoby (1996) 
and Nelson, McEvoy, and Schreiber (1998). The responses in each set were orthographically 
related because they were originally designed to create fragments that could be completed by 
either of the two responses (e.g., b_n_ could be completed by bone or bend). The forward and 
backward associative strengths between responses were low, on average (forward, M = .03, SD 
= .08; backward, M = .02, SD = .05), as indexed by Nelson et al. Five groups of 20 sets served as 
the critical items. Each group was matched on the lengths and frequencies of cues and responses. 
These groups served equally often in each within-subjects condition across participants. The 
rotation of groups through conditions produced five experimental formats. An additional three 
groups of three sets served as buffers in List 1 and as practice for the change detection task in 
List 2, and another three groups of two sets served as buffers in List 2 and practice test pairs. The 
assignment of these pairs to conditions remained constant across formats. 
List 1 consisted of 90 word pairs (e.g., knee–bone) that included six buffers to be used for the 
List 2 practice phase, four intermixed pairs to be used as buffers in List 2 and as practice test 
pairs, and 80 critical pairs. The six buffers appeared once each, whereas for the remaining pairs, 
half appeared twice and the other half appeared four times, for 258 total presentations. The List 2 
practice phase contained nine pairs (three of each item type), and List 2 included 106 pairs that 
consisted of six buffers and 100 critical pairs. Two buffers served in primacy positions and four 
served in recency positions. Twenty critical pairs were included in each within-participants 
condition. The A–B, A–B pairs consisted of the same pairs in Lists 1 and 2 (e.g., apple–
core, apple–core); the A–B, C–D control pairs appeared exclusively in List 2 (e.g., lamb–wool); 
and the A–B, A–D pairs consisted of the same cues in Lists 1 and 2 with different responses 
(e.g., knee–bone, knee–bend). At test, the six buffer pairs were used for practice, and the test 
included all 100 critical pairs. 
Procedure 
List 1 pairs appeared in a fixed random order with the restriction that none from the same 
condition appeared consecutively more than three times. Pairs were presented for 2 s each, 
followed by a 500-ms interstimulus interval (ISI). Participants were told that their task was to 
read pairs quickly because we were interested in their reading times. 
Participants first completed a List 2 practice phase prior to the presentation of List 2. In both 
phases, pairs appeared randomly with the same restrictions as in List 1. Participants’ first task 
was to study pairs for as long as was necessary to learn pairs completely for an upcoming test. 
Their second task was to indicate pairs for which responses had changed (A–B, A–D) and to 
recall the List 1 response (B). Boxes labeled “next” and “right word changed” appeared below 
pairs. Participants were told to click “next” when they had completed studying an unchanged 
pair or to click “right word changed” when they noticed a changed pair. After indicating a 
change, participants attempted to recall the List 1 response aloud, and their responses were 
recorded by an experimenter. The pair then remained on the screen with only the “next” box. 
Participants continued studying the pair until it was learned, at which point they clicked “next” to 
move on. 
At test, cues (the left-hand member of List 2 pairs) appeared randomly with the same restrictions 
as for the earlier lists. Participants were told to retrieve the List 2 responses and to report whether 
another response came to mind prior to or simultaneously with their final response. Pilot work 
showed that participants infrequently reported two words as coming to mind simultaneously. 
However, we assumed that these instances provided the same indirect evidence for retrieval of 
List 1 responses during List 2 study as did instances in which another word was reported as 
coming to mind prior to the recalled response. Consequently, participants were told that if this 
happened, they should first report the response that they thought was from List 2 and then report 
the other response as coming to mind first. The cues remained on the screen until the responses 
were recorded by the experimenter. Next, the message “Did another word come to mind?” 
appeared above boxes labeled “yes” and “no.” When participants clicked “yes,” the message, 
“What word came to mind?” appeared, and responses were recorded by an experimenter. When 
participants clicked “no,” the program advanced to the next item. 
Results and discussion 
For all experiments, the reported effects were significant below α = .05 unless otherwise noted. 
When present, variation in the degrees of freedom for conditional analyses was due to the 
exclusion of participants who did not have at least one observation in each cell. 
Table 1 shows that recall performance for A–B, A–B pairs was better following four than 
following two List 1 presentations (.88 vs. .82), t(39) = 3.46, and that overall recall was greater 
for A–B, A–B than for control pairs (.85 vs. .58), t(24) = 12.48. More important, recall of A–B, 
A–D pairs did not differ between List 1 presentation conditions (.57 vs. .58), t(24) = 1.96, nor 
did recall differ between A–B, A–D and control pairs (.58 vs. .58), t < 1. The lack of differences 
in the latter two comparisons suggests the presence of offsetting effects of proactive facilitation 
and interference on A–B, A–D pairs resulting from a mixture of the presence and absence of 
remindings. 
Table 1 Probability of recalling List 2 responses as a function of item type and List 1 
presentations: Experiments 1–3 
List 1 Presentations Item Type 
A–B, A–B Control* A–B, A–D 
Experiment 1 
Four .88 (.02) .58 (.03) .57 (.04) 
Two .82 (.02) .58 (.03) .58 (.04) 
Experiment 2 
Three .83 (.03) .64 (.04) .54 (.05) 
Experiment 3 
Four .79 (.03) .41 (.04) .44 (.04) 
Two .68 (.04) .41 (.04) .38 (.04) 
*Control pairs were not subjected to the manipulation of List 1 presentations, so the values for 
those pairs presented in Experiments 1 and 3 above are duplicates. Standard errors of the means 
are presented in parentheses. 
Effects of detection and recollection of change 
Detection of change for A–D pairs during presentation of List 2 was far less than perfect, but it 
was greater after four than after two List 1 presentations of A–B pairs (.76 vs. .62), t(39) = 6.54. 
Participants rarely indicated that responses had changed for A–B, A–B (.01) or control (.03) 
pairs. When change was detected, participants were extremely accurate in recalling the List 1 
response, and there was a marginal advantage following four as compared to two List 1 
presentations (.90 vs. .85), t(39) = 1.71, p = .096. For the later test of List 2 pairs, the remindings 
report procedure revealed that the probability of change recollection (Table 2) was lower than the 
probability of detecting change during List 2. However, as with change detection, recollection of 
change was higher after four than after two List 1 presentations (.42 vs. .38), t(24) = 1.88, p = .03 
(one-tailed). Note that the majority of responses reported as coming to mind first were from List 
1 (83 %), with the rest being from List 2 (8 %) or from outside the experiment (9 %). 
Table 2 Probability of a response coming to mind prior to responses recalled at test on A–B, A–
D pairs as a function of response type and List 1 presentations: Experiments 1–3 
List 1 Presentations Response Type 
List 1 List 2 Extra List 
Experiment 1 
Four .42 (.04) .05 (.02) .04 (.04) 
Two .38 (.04) .03 (.01) .05 (.01) 
Experiment 2 
Three .32 (.05) .04 (.01) .06 (.01) 
Experiment 3 
Four .31 (.05) .05 (.02) .06 (.02) 
Two .22 (.04) .03 (.01) .06 (.02) 
Standard errors of the means are presented in parentheses. 
The corresponding effect of List 1 repetitions on detection and recollection of change provides 
support for the validity of the remindings report procedure as a means of measuring recollection 
of change. Additional evidence that the remindings report procedure measured recollection of 
change was provided by the finding that the conditional probability of a List 1 response coming 
to mind first was dramatically higher when change was detected during the presentation of List 2 
than when it was not (.52 vs. .04), F(1, 37) = 137.23, η p 2 = .79. Furthermore, List 1 responses 
came to mind first almost exclusively when List 1 responses had been recalled rather than not 
recalled after detection of change during List 2 (.60 vs. .05), F(1, 21) = 144.75, η p 2 = .87. 
Neither of these effects interacted with List 1 presentations, Fs < 1.98. These results provide 
strong evidence that the probability of List 1 responses coming to mind prior to recalled 
responses at test reflected recollection of change detection during List 2. 
To explore the mixture of proactive facilitation and proactive interference effects on performance 
in the A–B, A–D condition, we examined recall conditionalized on detection and recollection of 
change. Recall was better when change was detected in List 2 than when change went undetected 
(.60 vs. .47), F(1, 37) = 8.92, η p 2 = .19. In addition, Fig. 1 shows that recall was dramatically 
higher when change was recollected at test (a List 1 response preceded the recalled response) as 
compared to when change was not recollected (no response came to mind first; .88 vs. .42), F(1, 
35) = 256.88, η p 2 = .88. We found no significant effects of, or interactions with, List 1 
presentations, Fs < 1.46. Further analyses revealed that recall was higher for A–B, A–D pairs 
when List 1 responses came to mind first as compared to controls (.88 vs. .59), t(35) = 12.56, and 
controls were higher than A–B, A–D pairs for which no response was reported as coming to 
mind first (.59 vs. .42), t(35) = 5.45. That is, proactive facilitation was observed for A–B, A–D 
pairs when remindings were recollected, and proactive interference was observed when they 
were not. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Probabilities of correct recall of List 2 responses for control pairs and for A–B, A–D pairs, 
conditionalized on whether a List 1 response was reported as coming to mind first or whether no 
other response was reported as coming to mind first. Recall of A–B, A–D pairs is collapsed 
across List 1 presentations in Experiments 1 and 3, because that manipulation produced no 
differences 
As is shown in Fig. 2, the effect of detecting change was dependent on its later recollection, F(2, 
54) = 54.36, η p 2 = .67. A–B, A–D performance when change was detected and a List 1 response 
came to mind first was better than when change was not detected and no other response was 
reported as coming to mind first (.88 vs. .52), t(27) = 7.71. More interesting, performance on 
pairs for which change was earlier detected but not recollected (no other response came to mind 
first at test) was actually lower than performance on pairs for which change was not detected and 
no other response came to mind first (.35 vs. .52), t(27) = –2.73. There was no effect of, or 
interaction with, List 1 presentations, Fs < 1. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Probabilities of correct recall of List 2 responses for A–B, A–D pairs in Experiment 1, 
conditionalized on change detection and whether a List 1 response was reported as coming to 
mind first or whether no other response was reported as coming to mind first 
The poorer recall performance produced by detection of change followed by failure to recollect 
change is informative with regard to the effects of the retrieval of List 1 responses during the 
presentation of List 2. Detection of change was often accompanied by recall of the corresponding 
List 1 response, which would be expected to enhance its subsequent recall and, thereby, increase 
its effectiveness as a competitor for the List 2 response. Bishara and Jacoby (2008) found that 
practice retrieving the List 1 response in an A–B, A–D paradigm increased proactive interference 
for older adults, but did not do so for young adults. These results were described as resulting 
from an effect of retrieval practice on an automatic influence of memory that comes into play 
when recollection fails, which was more common for older than for younger adults (e.g., Hay & 
Jacoby, 1999). In line with the results reported by Bishara and Jacoby 2008, retrieval practice 
that accompanied detection of change in the present experiment increased proactive interference 
only when change was not recollected. The finding of opposite effects of detecting change, 
dependent on its later recollection, joins earlier results in providing support for a dual-process 
model that distinguishes between recollection and automatic influences of memory. 
Change detection and study times 
Analyses of both the actual and log-transformed reaction times revealed no differences in the 
patterns of results. Consequently, only results from analyses of the actual reaction times are 
reported. The total List 2 presentation time, including the time it took participants to detect 
change and the time spent studying after change detection, is displayed in the top section of 
Table 3. The total presentation time was shorter for A–B, A–B items than for control items 
(4,080 vs. 5,138 ms), t(39) = –6.30, and shorter for control than for A–B, A–D items (5,138 vs. 
6,180 ms), t(39) = –6.45. In addition, A–B, A–B items following two List 1 presentations were 
studied longer than those with four List 1 presentations (4,304 vs. 3,856 ms), t(39) = 4.78. 
Finally, we found no difference in the presentation times for A–B, A–D items between the two 
and four List 1 presentation conditions (6,186 vs. 6,175 ms), t < 1. 
Table 3 Presentation time (in milliseconds) of List 2 items as a function of List 1 presentations 
and item type: Experiment 1 
Item Type List 1 Presentations 
Two Four 
Total Presentation Time 
A–B, A–B 4,304 (427) 3,856 (378) 
Control* 5,138 (477) 5,138 (477) 
A–B, A–D 6,186 (534) 6,175 (563) 
A–B, A–D Items 
No change detected 5,762 (590) 6,085 (671) 
Time to detect change 4,139 (281) 3,856 (254) 
Postchange detection study 2,423 (345) 2,396 (365) 
*Control pairs were not subjected to the manipulation of List 1 presentations, so the times for 
those pairs presented in each column above are duplicates. For conditional analyses of A–B, A–
D pairs in the lower panel, “No change detected” refers to the study time spent on pairs that were 
not identified as changed, “Time to detect change” refers to the time that it took participants to 
identify that pairs had changed responses, and “Postchange detection study” refers to the time 
that participants spent studying pairs after they had identified the pairs as changed. Standard 
errors of the means are presented in parentheses. 
When the study time for A–B, A–D items was broken down by whether change was detected 
(bottom panel of Table 3), there were no significant differences between List 1 presentation 
conditions, ts < 1.49. However, examination of the overall presentation times revealed that more 
total time was spent for A–B, A–D items on which change was detected than when change was 
not detected (6,399 vs. 5,822 ms), t(39) = 2.18. These results suggest awareness of the 
occurrence of change, which is not surprising, given the task of explicitly indicating when 
change had occurred. However, it is possible that participants may have become aware of change 
even if they had not been instructed to indicate awareness of change. We examined this 
possibility in Experiment 2. 
Item effects and recollection of change 
One might argue that the measures of change detection and recollection reflect the selection of 
items whose cues are more easily recognized or more easily associated with other items. To 
examine the contribution of item differences, we performed a hierarchical multiple regression 
analysis at the item level with A–B, A–D recall performance as the dependent measure. We 
entered performance on control pairs in the first step of the model to measure the effect of item 
differences. Performance on control pairs served as an index of item differences because they 
only appeared in List 2, which precluded any item-specific influence of pairs from List 1. 
Furthermore, pairs were rotated through conditions such that pairs that served as A–D pairs for 
some participants served as control pairs for other participants. That is, across participants, a 
particular item represented each of the experimental conditions. After controlling for item 
differences, we examined the extent to which recollection of change accounted for unique 
variance in A–B, A–D recall by entering the probability of recollection of change as measured by 
the remindings-report procedure in the second step of the model. We examined the variance 
accounted for by the recollection-of-change measure instead of the change detection measure 
because the results revealed that facilitation depended on the recollection of change, which 
occurred almost exclusively following earlier detection of change. Finally, we entered an 
interaction term for these variables in the third step of the model. 
Table 4 shows that although item differences accounted for variance in performance on A–B, A–
D pairs (Step 1), recollection of change still predicted unique variance in A–B, A–D recall 
beyond item differences (Step 2). The interaction term did not predict unique variance in A–B, 
A–D recall (Step 3). These results show that although item differences do contribute to 
performance on A–B, A–D pairs, the detection and recollection of change plays a role beyond 
that of item differences in producing effects. Clearly, the results obtained by conditionalizing 
List 2 recall in the A–B, A–D condition on recollection of change did not fully occur because of 
item selection effects. 
Table 4 Proportions of variance in A–B, A–D recall performance explained by item differences 
and by recollection of change: Experiments 1–3 
  Experiment 
1 2 3 
Step 1 
Item differences .24* .15* .16* 
Step 2 
Recollection of change .16* .27* .41* 
Step 3 
Item × Change interaction .00 .01 .00 
The values displayed above are changes in R 2 on each step of the model, computed at the item 
level collapsed across participants. “Item differences” refers to recall performance on control 
pairs, “Recollection of change” refers to the probability of participants’ reporting a List 1 
response coming to mind first at test for A–B, A–D pairs, and “Item × Change interaction” is the 
interaction term for the aforementioned predictor variables. Data were collapsed across List 1 
repetition conditions in Experiments 1 and 3. * p < .01. 
Individual differences and recollection of change 
In addition to examining the relationship between item differences and A–B, A–D recall, we also 
examined the relationship between individual differences in participants’ general memory ability 
and A–B, A–D recall. We used a hierarchical multiple regression analysis that was the same as 
that used to examine item differences, with the exception that it was conducted at the participant 
level. In this model, performance on control pairs was taken as an index of the general memory 
ability of participants. 
Table 5 shows that individual differences in general memory ability predicted performance on 
A–B, A–D pairs. However, when individual differences in general memory ability were 
controlled, recollection of change accounted for unique variance in A–B, A–D recall. That is, 
individual differences in the detection and recollection of change were also important for recall 
of A–B, A–D pairs. Similarly, results from prior research had suggested that individual 
differences in relating new to earlier studied information are important for later recall (e.g., 
Jacoby, 1974). The importance of individual differences in recollection of change provided 
additional evidence that the effects of conditionalizing List 2 recall on recollection of change did 
not fully occur because of item selection effects. 
Table 5 Proportions of variance in A–B, A–D recall performance explained by individual 
differences and by recollection of change: Experiments 1–3 
  Experiment 
1 2 3 
Step 1 
Individual differences .26* .71* .40* 
Step 2 
Recollection of change .34* .10* .51* 
Step 3 
Participant × Change interaction .00 .00 .00 
The values displayed above are changes in R 2 on each step of the model computed at the 
participant level, collapsed across items. “Individual differences” refers to recall performance on 
control pairs, “Recollection of change” refers to the probability of participants’ reporting a List 1 
response coming to mind first at test for A–B, A–D pairs, and “Participant × Change interaction” 
is the interaction term for the aforementioned predictor variables. Data were collapsed across 
List 1 repetition conditions in Experiments 1 and 3. * p < .01. 
Experiment 2 
The results from Experiment 1 showed that recall performance did not differ between control and 
A–B, A–D pairs. These results were shown to reflect a mixture of proactive facilitation when 
change was recollected and proactive interference owing to automatic influences of memory 
when change was not recollected. Experiment 2 was designed to gain evidence that participants 
would covertly detect change for A–B, A–D pairs during the presentation of List 2 even when 
they were not instructed to do so overtly, as in Experiment 1. To do this, we allowed participants 
to self-pace their study in List 2 and employed the remindings-report procedure at test. This 
allowed us to back-sort study time on the basis of whether or not List 1 responses came to mind 
prior to the recalled responses at test. If change for A–B, A–D pairs was covertly detected during 
List 2 presentation, then study times for A–B, A–D items that eventuated in the production of 
List 1 responses prior to recall were expected to be longer than those for items for which no 
response was reported as coming to mind first. 
Method 
Participants 
A group of 24 Washington University students participated in exchange for course credit or 
$10/h. All participants were tested individually. 
Design, materials, and procedure 
The design, materials, and procedure were the same as in Experiment 1, with the following 
exceptions. List 1 presentations were not manipulated; A–B pairs were presented three times 
each in List 1. The materials consisted of 88 of the three-word sets and four groups of buffers. 
These sets were assigned to within-participants conditions as in Experiment 1, except that an 
additional set of A–B control pairs were presented in List 1 that did not differ across the three 
experimental formats. Two groups of buffers were required for control pairs, because they 
differed in List 1 (A–B) and List 2 (C–D). List 1 consisted of 66 pairs (22 of each item type). 
There were 60 critical pairs, and the remaining six served as primacy and recency buffers in List 
2. Pairs appeared three times, for 198 total presentations. List 2 also consisted of 66 pairs. In 
addition, three buffers appeared at the beginnings and ends of the lists to control for primacy and 
recency effects. Finally, six buffer items were used for a practice test. 
In contrast to Experiment 1, participants were not required to indicate their detection of change, 
but rather were informed that for some items, the right-hand member of a pair would change 
between List 1 and List 2. Providing this information was meant to encourage covert detection of 
change. 
Results and discussion 
Table 1 shows that recall was better for A–B, A–B pairs than for controls (.83 vs. .64), t(23) = 
7.33, and greater for control than for A–B, A–D pairs (.64 vs. .54), t(23) = 4.17. The finding of 
proactive interference in Experiment 2, but not in Experiment 1, might reflect a lower probability 
of remindings during the presentation of List 2 in Experiment 2. Consistent with this possibility, 
Table 2 shows that the probability of a List 1 response coming to mind first for A–B, A–D pairs 
in Experiment 2 was numerically lower than in Experiment 1. List 1 responses again made up the 
bulk of responses that came to mind first (76 %), with the remaining responses being from List 2 
(10 %) or from outside of the experiment (14 %). 
Just as was found in Experiment 1, when the remindings-report procedure showed that change 
was recollected, proactive facilitation was found. In contrast, when change was not recollected, 
proactive interference was found (Fig. 1). Recall was higher for A–B, A–D pairs when the List 1 
response came to mind first, as compared to controls (.99 vs. .66), t(22) = 8.32, and higher for 
controls than for A–B, A–D pairs for which no response came to mind first (.66 vs. .35), t(22) = 
6.47. 
Analyses of both the actual and log-transformed reaction times revealed no differences in the 
patterns of results. Consequently, results from analyses of the actual reaction times are reported. 
Study time analyses showed that A–B, A–B pairs were studied for less time than were controls 
(4,330 vs. 5,106 ms), t(23) = –3.07, and that study times did not differ for control and A–B, A–D 
pairs (5,106 vs. 4,912 ms), t < 1. The finding that study times did not differ for A–B, A–D pairs 
and controls reflected a mixture of the presence and absence of remindings for A–B, A–D pairs. 
Analyses in which study time was back-sorted on the basis of reports of remindings at test 
provided evidence of covert detection of change for a subset of A–D pairs during List 2 
presentation. A–D pairs for which the remindings-report procedure revealed that the List 1 
response came to mind prior to output of the List 2 response were studied longer than were A–D 
pairs for which no other response was reported as coming to mind first (5,273 vs. 
4,763 ms), t(22) = 2.40. This correspondence between recollection of change, as measured by the 
remindings-report procedure, and study time provides evidence of covert detection of change 
during List 2. More time during the presentation of List 2 was devoted to A–D pairs for which 
change was later recollected because detection of change requires time, and devoting any 
additional study time to those items required that change was detected. 
Item effects and recollection of change 
We examined the effects of item differences and recollection of change on A–B, A–D recall 
performance in the same manner as in Experiment 1. The results in Table 4 show convergence 
with those from Experiment 1 in demonstrating that although item differences accounted for 
unique variance in A–B, A–D recall performance, recollection of change accounted for variance 
above and beyond item differences. Again, the interaction term did not explain variance in A–B, 
A–D recall. 
Individual differences and recollection of change 
Also using the same analysis as in Experiment 1, we examined the effects of individual 
differences in general memory ability and recollection of change on A–B, A–D recall 
performance. Table 5 shows that, as in Experiment 1, general memory differences did account 
for variance in A–B, A–D recall, but recollection of change accounted for variance above and 
beyond those differences. The interaction term did not explain variance in A–B, A–D recall. 
Experiment 3 
The results from Experiments 1 and 2 provided evidence that recall of A–B, A–D pairs benefited 
from remindings, whether or not the remindings were overtly indicated. However, in both of the 
earlier experiments participants had self-paced their study, which may have allowed them to 
spend more time studying A–B, A–D pairs on which remindings occurred, resulting in increased 
performance on those pairs. We designed Experiment 3 to rule out this possibility by bringing 
List 2 study under experimenter control. Otherwise, the design of Experiment 3 was the same as 
that of Experiment 1. Despite the change to experimenter-controlled study times, we expected 
that the probability of remindings would again increase with List 1 presentations and that recall 
of A–B, A–D pairs would again reflect a mixture of facilitation and interference effects resulting 
from the presence and absence of remindings. 
Method 
Participants 
A group of 25 Washington University students participated in exchange for course credit or 
$10/h. All participants were tested individually. 
Design, materials, and procedure 
The design, materials, and procedure were identical to those of Experiment 1, with the exception 
that there was no practice phase prior to List 2 presentation, List 2 no longer included the change 
detection measure, and the presentation duration in List 2 was fixed at 2 s per pair instead of 
being self-paced. 
Results and discussion 
As in the earlier experiments, Table 1 shows that the probability of recalling the List 2 response 
was higher for A–B, A–B than for control pairs (.73 vs. .41), t(24) = 9.82. Also, recall for A–B, 
A–B pairs was higher after four than after two List 1 presentations (.79 vs. .68), t(24) = 3.45. As 
we found in Experiment 1, performance on A–B, A–D pairs did not differ from that on control 
pairs (.41 vs. .41), t < 1. However, there was a marginally significant advantage for A–B, A–D 
pairs with four rather than two List 1 presentations (.44 vs. .38), t(24) = 1.96, p = .06. These 
results again point to offsetting facilitation and interference effects resulting from the presence 
and absence of remindings. In addition, the tendency for performance on A–B, A–D pairs to be 
higher following four than following two List 1 presentations suggests that more items in the 
former condition benefited from the facilitative effects of remindings. 
Table 2 shows that the probability that a List 1 response was reported as having come to mind 
first was higher after four than after two List 1 presentations (.31 vs. .22), t(24) = 2.84, 
replicating the results of Experiment 1 by showing that remindings increased with the 
accessibility of List 1 responses. As is shown in Table 1, the probability of recall in 
Experiment 3 was lower for all conditions than in Experiment 1, which likely reflects the 
reduction in study time produced by bringing study time under experimenter control. The results 
in Table 2 show that List 1 responses were reported as coming to mind first less often in the 
present experiment than in Experiment 1 (.26 vs. .40), F(1, 63) = 6.03, η p 2 = .09. This 
difference did not interact with the number of List 1 presentations, F = 1.04. As in the earlier 
experiments, List 1 responses comprised the majority of those reported as coming to mind first 
(73 %), whereas the remaining responses were from List 2 (11 %) or from outside the 
experiment (16 %). 
Also in agreement with results from the earlier experiments (Fig. 1), List 2 recall was 
dramatically higher when a List 1 response was reported as coming to mind first, as compared to 
when no response was reported as coming to mind first (.93 vs. .24), F(1, 20) = 471.25, η p 2= 
.96. Neither the main effect of number of List 1 presentations nor its interaction with the effect of 
remindings was significant, Fs < 1.88. The probability of recall was higher for A–B, A–D pairs 
for which the List 1 response was reported as coming to mind first than for controls (.93 vs. 
.41), t(20) = 10.94, and performance on controls was higher than on A–B, A–D pairs for which 
no response was reported as coming to mind first (.41 vs. .24), t(20) = 5.37. Comparing the 
results of Experiments 1 and 3, it is notable that the reduction in study time produced by its being 
brought under experimenter control in Experiment 3 reduced List 2 recall for control pairs and 
for pairs from the A–B, A–D condition for which recall was not preceded by a List 1 response 
coming to mind. In contrast, when List 2 recall was preceded by a List 1 response coming to 
mind, recall was somewhat higher in Experiment 3 than in Experiment 1. Clearly, the finding of 
proactive facilitation does not depend on the study time being under participant control, with a 
greater amount of study time being devoted to A–B, A–D pairs. 
Item effects and recollection of change 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, we examined the effects of item differences and recollection of 
change on A–B, A–D recall performance. The results in Table 4 again converge with those of the 
earlier experiments in showing that although item differences accounted for unique variance in 
A–B, A–D recall performance, recollection of change accounted for variance above and beyond 
item differences. Again, the interaction term did not explain variance in A–B, A–D recall. 
Individual differences and recollection of change 
Also using the same analysis as in Experiments 1 and 2, we examined effects of individual 
differences in general memory ability and recollection of change on A–B, A–D recall 
performance. Table 5 shows that, again, general memory differences did account for variance in 
A–B, A–D recall, but recollection of change accounted for variance above and beyond those 
differences. The interaction term did not explain variance in A–B, A–D recall. 
For each of our experiments, the results revealed that individual differences in recollection of 
change significantly contributed to the recall of List 2 responses. The magnitudes of the variance 
accounted for by general memory differences were larger in Experiment 3 than in the earlier 
experiments. This is understandable, because study time was experimenter-paced in 
Experiment 3, whereas study was self-paced in the earlier experiments. Self-paced study allowed 
for List 2 recall to be enhanced by means other than recollection of change, as evidenced by the 
differences in performance on control pairs across experiments. Retrieval based on these other 
origins reduced the contribution of individual differences in recollection of change to List 2 
recall. Also, in contrast to Experiment 1, participants were not instructed to indicate change in 
Experiment 3, which afforded a greater opportunity for individual differences in self-initiated 
detection of change to contribute to List 2 recall. 
General discussion 
The results of our experiments show that recall of List 2 responses in an A–B, A–D paradigm 
reflects a mixture of proactive facilitation and proactive interference. The detection and 
recollection of change produces proactive facilitation when responses are changed across lists 
(A–B, A–D). Increasing the number of presentations of A–B had the effect of increasing the 
detection of change and, thereby, produced increased memory for A–D. In the absence of 
detection and recollection of change, prior presentation of A–B reduced later memory of A–D as 
compared to a control condition (i.e., proactive interference). When overt detection of change 
was not required, evidence of covert change detection was found (Exp. 2). Proactive facilitation 
was not diminished by bringing study time under experimenter control, although the resultant 
reduction in study time did reduce the probability of List 2 recall for control pairs and A–B, A–D 
pairs for which change was not recollected (Exp. 3). For each of the experiments, hierarchical 
multiple regression analyses revealed that recollection of change contributed to the correct recall 
of List 2 responses when item differences were controlled, showing that the results from analyses 
that relied on conditionalizing List 2 recall on recollection of change were not fully due to item 
selection effects. 
The validity of our remindings-report procedure as a measure of recollection of change was 
supported by convergence of the results from that measure with those from the detection-of-
change measure (Exp. 1). Increasing the number of presentations of A–B pairs increased the 
probability of detection of change for A–B, A–D pairs during presentation of List 2, and also 
increased the probability of the List 1 response being reported as having come to mind prior to 
the response that was recalled as having been presented in List 2, our measure of recollection of 
change. The List 2 response was more likely to be correctly recalled when change was detected 
during the presentation of List 2 than when it was not, which corresponds with the proactive 
facilitation that was observed when change was recollected at the time of test, as measured by 
the remindings-report procedure. Furthermore, when the List 1 response was recalled along with 
change detection during List 2, the List 1 response was very frequently reported as having come 
to mind prior to the response that was recalled as having come from List 2 on the later test, 
which almost never happened in the absence of the List 1 response being recalled along with 
change detection during List 2 presentation. 
Others have attributed facilitation effects to memory of a List 2 response being mediated by 
memory for a List 1 response (e.g., Barnes & Underwood, 1959) and have explained proactive 
interference as resulting from response competition (e.g., Postman & Underwood, 1973). In 
contrast, we hold that proactive facilitation results from recollection of change that relies on the 
List 1 response being embedded in memory for the List 2 response due to recursive reminding. 
The recursive-reminding account of proactive facilitation effects holds an advantage over the 
mediation account in that it explains the importance of awareness of the relationship between 
List 1 and List 2 pairs for the finding of facilitation effects (e.g., R. B. Martin & Dean, 1964), 
whereas a mediation account does not do so. 
According to our dual-process model, proactive facilitation results when change is recollected. 
When change is not recollected, proactive interference is produced by response competition that 
originates from reliance on a more automatic basis for responding. Arranging the situation so 
that opposite effects are produced by recollection and automatic influences, as was done by 
examining the effects of change, holds an advantage as a means of showing the existence of two 
bases for responding (e.g., Jacoby, 1991). The results of the present experiments converge with 
those from other experiments in providing support for a dual-process model of memory. For 
example, the results from Experiment 1 revealed that the retrieval of a List 1 response in the 
context of change detection produced facilitation when the change was later recollected, but 
increased proactive interference when the change was not. Similarly, Bishara and Jacoby (2008) 
found that practicing retrieval of a competing response increased proactive interference in an A–
B, A–D paradigm, but did so only for older adults who have a reduced ability to recollect. 
A critic might argue that our findings of proactive facilitation arose because the conditionalizing 
of List 2 recall on remindings serves to select items for which participants are able to remember 
the list membership of pairs. However, implicating the importance of list discrimination is of 
little value if one does not specify the basis for list discrimination. We hold that both list 
discrimination and recall of List 2 responses reflect recursive reminding involved in the detection 
of change. To support this position, Jacoby and Wahlheim (2012) employed procedures similar 
to those in the present experiments but examined the effects of detection of change on list 
discrimination rather than on recall of List 2 responses. Participants were asked to judge whether 
or not a test pair had earlier been presented in List 2. The results revealed that later list 
discrimination was near perfect following the detection of change in List 2, but much poorer if 
change was not detected. That is, the results for list discrimination parallel those found in the 
present experiments for List 2 recall. 
The finding of parallel results between list discrimination and recall is unsurprising if both reflect 
reliance on the List 1 response being embedded in memory for the List 2 response as a result of 
recursive reminding. Also, list discrimination can be seen as closely related to recency 
judgments, which have been shown to be reliant on recursive reminding (e.g., Hintzman, 2011). 
Recency judgments typically require participants to judge the recency of items presented within 
a list, whereas list discrimination requires a between-list judgment of recency. Clearly, there are 
multiple bases for list discrimination, just as there are for recency judgments, including 
differences in memory strength and associations with list context (e.g., Hintzman, 2005; Kahana, 
Howard, & Polyn, 2008; Winograd, 1968), as well as recursive remindings. However, recursive 
remindings that accompany detection of change are a particularly important basis for list 
discrimination. Returning to the example of the self-contradicting politician used to begin this 
article, recursive remindings likely serve to both facilitate memory for the changed position and 
enhance memory for what the politician last claimed to believe, along with the contexts in which 
the conflicting beliefs were expressed. 
The results reported here are related to results reported by Postman and Gray (1977). They 
manipulated the method of learning to examine effects on proactive interference in an A–B, A–D 
paradigm, using single letters paired with adjectives. Multiple study and test trials were 
employed for the learning of List 2. For test trials during List 2 learning in an “accretion” 
condition, participants were given a sheet of paper that listed the left-hand members of pairs as 
cues for recall of Lists 1 and 2. They were instructed to write the List 1 responses in one column 
and then to write the List 2 responses in an adjacent column. For a “replacement” condition, 
participants only recalled List 2 responses. Long-term retention of List 2 responses showed less 
proactive interference and superior list discrimination in the accretion condition as compared to 
the replacement condition. Postman and Gray attributed the reduction in proactive interference in 
the accretion condition to the improved list differentiation. The multiple recalls of List 1 along 
with List 2 responses in the accretion condition were said to provide repeated opportunities to 
note differences between the lists while practicing list discrimination. The resulting increase in 
the distinctiveness of “list tags” attached to memory for pairs was held to be responsible for the 
reduced proactive interference in the accretion condition. An account of that sort holds that list 
discrimination relies on simple associations and list tags, whereas we argue that list 
discrimination is preserved by memory for the relationship between A–B, A–D pairs in the form 
of a recursive representation (see Asch, 1969, for contrasts between the effects of simple 
associations and memory for higher-order relationships; see also Criss & Shiffrin, 2005, for 
evidence that list discrimination can rely on memory for higher-order relationships). Because of 
differences in the materials and procedures, the basis for list differentiation might differ between 
our experiment and that of Postman and Gray (1977). 
Postman and Gray’s (1977) procedures did not allow them to investigate detection of the change 
in responses in the A–B, A–D condition. Consequently, they were unable to observe that 
awareness of the change in response was a critical determinant of whether proactive interference 
or proactive facilitation was observed. However, despite the numerous differences in procedures, 
our results agree with those reported by Postman and Gray in showing the benefit of bringing 
List 1 responses to mind in the presence of List 2 responses. In this vein, Sahakyan and 
Goodmon (2007) examined the effects of proactive interference on memory for lists of single 
words in a directed-forgetting paradigm. Their results revealed that the presence of associations 
between words in the two lists reduced proactive interference. They interpreted that finding as 
showing the benefit of List 1 items coming to mind during the presentation of List 2. 
Here, we have focused on proactive effects of memory, but detection and recollection of change 
also likely play an important role in retroactive effects of memory. In line with this possibility, 
Loftus (1979) demonstrated the importance of conditions that lead to detection of change for 
eliminating misinformation effects (i.e., retroactive interference). In her experiments, participants 
were presented with a slide show of an event and were then tested on details from the slides. 
Following that, participants read a narrative about the event that included a few pieces of 
information that had been changed. The primary manipulation was whether a piece of blatantly 
contradictory information was included in the narrative. When a blatant contradiction was 
present, participants were able to notice it along with a large proportion of the other changed 
items. This resulted in their avoiding misinformation effects. In contrast, when a blatant 
contradiction was not present, the changed items went largely unnoticed, resulting in 
misinformation effects. These results are similar to the findings in the present experiments that 
detecting and recollecting change produced facilitation, whereas the failure to do so resulted in 
interference. Together, these studies highlight the importance of detecting change and the 
formation of embedded representations that include the reminding event and its constituents for 
both proactive and retroactive effects of memory. 
Acknowledging the importance of detection and recollection of change is useful for explaining 
discrepancies across studies in the older literature that have examined proactive and retroactive 
effects of memory. Although A–B, A–D paradigms are typically used to investigate interference 
effects of changing the response paired with a cue, several studies have shown that changing 
responses does not always result in interference effects (e.g., Barnes & Underwood, 1959; Bruce 
& Weaver, 1973; Postman, 1964; Robbins & Bray, 1974). Anderson and McCulloch (1999) 
suggested that these discrepancies can be explained by differences in the extent to which 
conditions facilitated the integration of responses across lists. The advantage of a recursive-
remindings framework is that it describes the mechanism by which the integration of responses is 
accomplished, with the mechanism being the detection and recollection of change. 
Beyond proactive and retroactive effects demonstrated in paired-associate and misinformation 
paradigms, a recursive-remindings framework is applicable to domains examining effects on 
memory for more complex materials (cf. Benjamin & Ross, 2010). Returning to the earlier 
example of the politician who flip-flops, exploring memory for incongruent political statements 
would be informative about the extents to which people detect and recollect contradictions (cf. 
Glenberg & Epstein, 1987). Memory for change might also play an important role in memory for 
schema inconsistent information about people (cf. Hastie & Kumar, 1979). Furthermore, 
detection and recollection of change might be important for understanding the role of coherence 
in the construction and maintenance of mental models in text comprehension (cf. Albrecht & 
O’Brien, 1993). These are just a few examples that illustrate the potential importance of 
recursive remindings as an overarching framework for understanding phenomena across a broad 
range of domains that have otherwise been treated as largely separate. 
Finally, the results from the present experiments revealed that individual differences in 
recollection of change predicted recall of List 2 responses. Such individual differences in the 
detection and recollection of change might be important for a variety of tasks, including the tasks 
described in the preceding paragraph. Evidence consistent with this suggestion was found by Zhu 
et al. (2010), who showed that individual differences in the susceptibility to misinformation 
effects (retroactive interference) correlated with differences in change detection in a perceptual 
task. Also, those who are less likely to detect and recollect change might be less likely to detect 
and recollect consistency among events. For example, Jacoby (1974) reported results pointing to 
the importance of individual differences in memory for categorically related information due to 
differences in looking back at information presented earlier during study. Similarly, Potts and 
colleagues (Potts, 1977; Potts, Keller, & Rooley, 1981; Potts & Peterson, 1985) have shown 
individual differences in the ability to integrate new learning with preexisting knowledge in 
linear-ordering tasks. Investigation of detection and recollection of change in the context of 
memory tasks has been largely neglected, but it holds promise as a means of investigating 
individual differences as well as proactive and retroactive effects of memory. 
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